JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
cooperate. This is certainly true on the last move since there is no future to influence. On the nextto-last move they will also have no incentive to cooperate since they can anticipate mutual defection on the last move. This line of reasoning implies that the game will unravel all the way back to mutual defection on the first move of any sequence of plays which is of known finite length (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, pp. 94-102) . This reasoning does not apply if the players will interact an indefinite number of times. With an indefinite number of interactions, cooperation can emerge. This article will explore the precise conditions necessary for this to happen.
The importance of this problem is indicated by a brief explanation of the role it has played in a variety of fields.
1. Political Philosophy. Hobbes regarded the state of nature as equivalent to what we now call a two-person Prisoner's Dilemma, and he built his justification for the state upon the purported impossibility of sustained cooperation in such a situation (Taylor, 1976, pp. 98-116) . A demonstration that mutual cooperation could emerge among rational egoists playing the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma would provide a powerful argument that the role of the state should not be as universal as some have argued.
2. International Politics. Today nations interact without central control, and therefore the conclusions about the requirements for the emergence of cooperation have empirical relevance to many central issues of international politics. Examples include many varieties of the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978) such as arms competition and its obverse, disarmament (Rapoport, 1960) ; alliance competition (Snyder, 1971) ; and communal conflict in Cyprus (Lumsden, 1973) . The selection of the American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 illustrates the problem of choosing an effective strategy in the context of a continuing relationship. Had the United States been perceived as continuing business as usual, the Soviet Union might have been encouraged to try other forms of noncooperative behavior later. On the other hand, any substantial lessening of U.S. cooperation risked some form of retaliation which could then set off counter-retaliation, setting up a pattern of mutual defection that could be difficult to get out of. Much of the domestic debate over foreign policy is over problems of just this type.
3. Economic and social exchange. Our everyday lives contain many exchanges whose terms are not enforced by any central authority. Even in economic exchanges, business ethics are maintained by the knowledge that future interactions are likely to be affected by the outcome of the current exchange.. 4. International political economy. Multinational corporations can play off host governments to lessen their tax burdens in the absence of coordinated fiscal policies between the affected governments. Thus the commodity exporting country and the commodity importing country are in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with each other, whether they fully appreciate it or not (Laver, 1977) .
In the literatures of these areas, there has been a convergence on the nature of the problem to be analyzed. All agree that the two-person Prisoner's Dilemma captures an important part of the strategic interaction. All agree that what makes the emergence of cooperation possible is the possibility that interaction will continue. The tools of the analysis have been surprisingly similar, with game theory serving to structure the enterprise.
As a paradigm case of the emergence of cooperation, consider the development of the norms of a legislative body, such as the United States Senate. Each senator has an incentive to appear effective for his or her constituents even at the expense of conflicting with other senators who are trying to appear effective for their constituents. But this is hardly a zero-sum game since there are many opportunities for mutually rewarding activities between two senators. One of the consequences is that an elaborate set of norms, or folkways, have emerged in the Senate. Among the most important of these is the norm of reciprocity, a folkway which involves helping out a colleague and getting repaid in kind. It includes vote trading, but it extends to so many types of mutually rewarding behavior that "it is not an exaggeration to say that reciprocity is a way of life in the Senate" (Matthews, 1960, p. 100; see also Mayhew, 1974) .
Washington was not always like this. Early observers saw the members of the Washington community as quite unscrupulous, unreliable, and characterized by "falsehood, deceit, treachery" (Smith, 1906, p. 190) . But by now the practice of reciprocity is well established. Even the significant changes in the Senate over the last two decades toward more decentralization, more openness, and more equal distribution of power have come without abating the folkway of reciprocity (Ornstein, Peabody and Rhode, 1977). I will show that we do not need to assume that senators are more honest, more generous, or more public-spirited than in earlier years to explain how cooperation based on reciprocity has emerged and proven stable. The emergence of cooperation can be explained as a consequence of senators pursuing their own interests.
The approach taken here is to investigate how individuals pursuing their own interests will act, and then see what effects this will have for the system as a whole. Put another way, the approach is to make some assumptions about micro-motives, and then deduce consequences for macrobehavior (Schelling, 1978) . Thinking about the paradigm case of a legislature is a convenience, but the same style of reasoning can apply to the emergence of cooperation between individuals in many other political settings, or even to relations between nations. While investigating the conditions which foster the emergence of cooperation, one should bear in mind that cooperation is not always socially desirable. There are times when public policy is best served by the prevention of cooperation-as in the need for regulatory action to prevent collusion between oligopolistic business enterprises.
The basic situation I will analyze involves pairwise interactions.' I assume that the player can recognize another player and remember how the two of them have interacted so far. This allows the history of the particular interaction to be taken into account by a player's strategy.
A variety of ways to resolve the dilemma of the Prisoner's Dilemma have been developed. Each involves allowing some additional activity which alters the strategic interaction in such a way as to fundamentally change the nature of the problem. The original problem remains, however, because there are many situations in which these remedies are not available. I wish to consider the problem in its fundamental form.
1. There is no mechanism available to the players to make enforceable threats or commitments (Schelling, 1960) . Since the players cannot make commitments, they must take into account all possible strategies which might be used by the other player, and they have all possible strategies available to themselves.
2. There is no way to be sure what the other player will do on a given move. This eliminates the possibility of metagame analysis (Howard, 1971 ) which allows such options as "make the same choice as the other player is about to make." It also eliminates the possibility of reliable reputations such as might be based on watching the other player interact with third parties.
3. There is no way to change the other player's 'A single player may be interacting with many others, but the player is interacting with them one at a time. The situations which involve more than pairwise interaction can be modeled with the more complex n-person Prisoner's Dilemma (Olson, 1965; G. Hardin, 1968 ; R. Hardin, 1971; Schelling, 1973) . The principal application is to the provision of collective goods. It is possible that the results from pairwise interactions will help suggest how to undertake a deeper analysis of the n-person case as well, but that must wait. For a parallel treatment of the two-person and n-person cases, see Taylor (1976, pp. 29-62). utilities. The utilities already include whatever consideration each player has for the interests of the other (Taylor, 1976, pp. 69-83) .
Under these conditions, words not backed by actions are so cheap as to be meaningless. The players can communicate with each other only through the sequence of their own behavior. This is the problem of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in its fundamental form.
Two things remain to be specified: how the payoff of a particular move relates to the payoff in a whole sequence, and the precise meaning of a strategy. A natural way to aggregate payoffs over time is to assume that later payoffs are worth less than earlier ones, and that this relationship is expressed as a constant discount per move (Shubik, 1959 (Shubik, , 1970 . Thus the next payoff is worth only a fraction, w, of the same payoff this move. A whole string of mutual defection would then have a "present value" of P+ wP+ w2P+ w3P. . . = P/(1-w).
The discount parameter, w, can be given either of two interpretations. The standard economic interpretation is that later consumption is not valued as much as earlier consumption. An alternative interpretation is that future moves may not actually occur, since the interaction between a pair of players has only a certain probability of continuing for another move. In either interpretation, or a combination of the two, w is strictly between zero and one. The smaller w is, the less important later moves are relative to earlier ones.
For a concrete example, suppose one player is following the policy of always defecting, and the other player is following the policy of TIT FOR TAT. TIT FOR TAT is the policy of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the previous move. This means that TIT FOR TAT will defect once for each defection by the other player. When the other player is using TIT FOR TA T, a player who always defects will get T on the first move, and P on all the subsequent moves. The payoff to someone using ALL D when playing with someone using TIT FOR TAT is thus: Both ALL D and TIT FOR TA Tare strategies. In general, a strategy (or decision rule) is a function from the history of the game so far into a probability of cooperation on the next move. Strategies can be stochastic, as in the example of a rule which is entirely random with equal probabilities of cooperation and defection on each move. A strategy can also be quite sophisticated in its use of the pattern of outcomes in the game so far to determine what to do next. It may, for ex-ample, use Bayesian techniques to estimate the parameters of some model it might have of the other player's rule. Or it may be some complex combination of other strategies. But a strategy must rely solely on the information available through this one sequence of interactions with the particular player.
The first question one is tempted to ask is, "What is the best strategy?" This is a good question, but unfortunately there is no best rule independent of the environment which it might have to face. The reason is that what works best when the other player is unconditionally cooperative will not in general work well when the other player is conditionally cooperative, and vice versa. To prove this, I will introduce the concept of a nice strategy, namely, one which will never be the first to defect. which is less than V(A'IB) = T/(1-w). On the other hand, if A is not nice, let A' = ALL C, and let B be the strategy of cooperating until the other player defects and then always defects. Eventually A will be the first to defect, say, on move n. The value of n is irrelevant for the comparison to follow, so assume that n = 1. To give A the maximum advantage, assume that A always defects after its first defection. Then V(A 1B) = T + wP/(1-w).
But V(A'IB) = R/(1-w) = R+wR/(1-w). Thus V(AIB) < V(A'IB) whenever w > (T-R)/(T-P).
Thus the immediate advantage gained by the defection of A will eventually be more than compensated for by the long-term disadvantage of B's unending defection, assuming that w is sufficiently large. Thus, if w is sufficiently large, there is no one best strategy.
In the paradigm case of a legislature, this theorem says that if there is a large enough chance that a member of Congress will interact again with another member of Congress, then there is no one best strategy to use independently of the strategy being used by the other person. It would be best to be cooperative with someone who will reciprocate that cooperation in the future, but not with someone whose future behavior will not be very much affected by this interaction (see, for example, The biological motivation for this approach is based on the interpretation of the payoffs in terms of fitness (survival and fecundity). All mutations are possible, and if any could invade a given population it would have had the chance to do so. Thus only a collectively stable strategy is expected to be able to maintain itself in the long-run equilibrium as the strategy used by all.4 Collectively stable strategies are important because they are the only ones which an entire population can maintain in the long run if mutations are introduced one at a time.
The political motivation for this approach is based on the assumption that all strategies are possible, and that if there were a strategy which would benefit an individual, someone is sure to try it. Thus only a collectively stable strategy can maintain itself as the strategy used by all-provided that the individuals who are trying out novel strategies do not interact too much with one another.5 As we shall see later, if they do interact in clusters, then new and very important developments become possible.
A difficulty in the use of this concept of collective stability is that it can be very hard actually to determine which strategies have it and which do not. In most biological applications, including both the Prisoner's Dilemma and other types of interactions, this difficulty has been dealt with in 
TIT FOR TAT as a Collectively Stable Strategy
TIT FOR TAT cooperates on the first move, and then does whatever the other player did on the previous move. This means that any rule which starts off with a defection will get T, the highest possible payoff, on the first move when playing TITFOR TAT. Consequently, TITFOR TAT can only avoid being invadable by such a rule if the game is likely to last long enough for the retaliation to counteract the temptation to defect. In fact, no rule can invade TIT FOR TATif the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently large. This is the heart of the formal result contained in the following theorem. Readers who wish to skip the proofs can do so without loss of continuity. The significance of this theorem is that it demonstrates that if everyone in a population is cooperating with everyone else because each is using the TIT FOR TA T strategy, no one can do better using any other strategy provided the discount parameter is high enough. For example, using the numerical values of the payoff parameters given in Figure 1 , TIT FOR TA T is uninvadable when the discount parameter, w, is greater than 2/3. If w falls below this critical value, and everyone else is using TIT FOR TA T, it will pay to defect on alternative moves. For w less than 1/2, ALL D can also invade.
THEOREM 2. TIT FOR TAT is a collectively stable strategy if and only if w> max( T-) R .) An alternative formulation of T-P R-S the same result is that TIT FOR TAT is a collectively stable strategy if and only if it is invadable neither by ALL D nor the strategy which alternates defection and cooperation.

PROOF. First we prove that the two formulations of the theorem are equivalent, and then we prove both implications of the second formulation. To say that ALL D cannot invade TIT FOR TAT means that V(ALL DITFT) < V(TFTITFT). As shown earlier, V(ALL DITFT) = T + wP/(l1-w). Since TFT always cooperates with its twin, V(TFTITFT) = R + wR W2R.... = R/(l-w). Thus ALL D cannot invade TIT FOR TAT when T + wP/(I1-w) < R /(1-w), or T(1-w)+ wP<R, or T-R<w(T-P) or wT-R T-P Similarly, to say that alternation of D and C cannot invade TIT FOR TAT means that T-R (T+ wS)I (l -w2) < R /(1-w), or S < w. Thus R-S T-R T-R w > p and w> ~s is equivalent to saying T-P R-S that TIT FOR TA T is invadable by neither
One specific implication is that if the other player is unlikely to be around much longer because of apparent weakness, then the perceived value of w falls and the reciprocity of TIT FOR TA T is no longer stable. We have Caesar's explanation of why Pompey's allies stopped cooperating with him. "They regarded his IPompey's] prospects as hopeless and acted according to the common rule by which a man's friends become his enemies in adversity" (trans. by Warner, 1960, p. 328). Another example is the business institution of the factor who buys a client's accounts receivable. This is done at a very substantial discount when the firm is in trouble because once a manufacturer begins to go under, even his best customers begin refusing payment for merchandise, claiming defects in quality, failure to meet specifications, tardy delivery, or whathave-you. The great enforcer of morality in commerce is the continuing relationship, the belief that one will have to do business again with this customer, or this supplier, and when a failing company loses this automatic enforcer, not even a strong-arm factor is likely to find a substitute (Mayer, 1974, p 
. 280).
Similarly, any member of Congres who is perceived as likely to be defeated in the next election may have some difficulty doing legislative business with colleagues on the usual basis of trust and good credit.7
There are many other examples of the importance of long-term interaction for the stability of cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is easy to maintain the norms of reciprocity in a stable small town or ethnic neighborhood. Conversely, a visiting professor is likely to receive poor treatment by other faculty members compared to the way these same prople treat their regular colleagues.
Another consequence of the previous theorem is that if one wants to prevent rather than promote cooperation, one should keep the same individuals from interacting too regularly with each other. Consider the practice of the government selecting two aerospace companies for competitive development contracts. Since firms specialize to some degree in either air force or in navy planes, there is a tendency for firms with the same specialties to be frequently paired in the final competition (Art, 1968) . To make tacit collusion between companies more difficult, the government should seek methods of compensating for the specialization. Pairs of companies which shared a specialization would then expect to interact less often in the final competitions. This would cause the later interactions between them to be worth relatively less than before, reducing the value of w. If w is sufficiently low, reciprocal cooperation in the form of tacit collusion ceases to be' a stable policy.
Knowing when TIT FOR TAT cannot be invaded is valuable, but it is only a part of the story. Other strategies may be, and in fact are, also collectively stable. This suggests the question of what a strategy has to do to be collectively stable. In other words, what policies, if adopted by everyone, will prevent any one individual from benefiting by a departure from the common strategy?
The Characterization of Collectively Stable Strategies
The characterization of all collectively stable strategies is based on the idea that invasion can be prevented if the rule can make the potential invader worse off than if it had just followed 7A countervailing consideration is that a legislator in electoral trouble may receive help from friendly colleagues who wish to increase the chances of reelection of someone who has proven in the past to be cooperative, trustworthy, and effective. 
The theorem which follows embodies the advice that if you want to employ a collectively stable strategy, you should only cooperate when you can afford an exploitation by the other side and still retain your secure position. 
Combined with (2) this gives V(A'IB) > V(BIB).
Hence A' invades B, contrary to the assumption that B is a collectively stable strategy. Therefore, if B is a collectively stable strategy, it must defect when required. Figure 2 illustrates the use of this theorem. The dotted line shows the value which must not be exceeded by any A if B is to be a collectively stable strategy. This value is just V(B IB), the expected payoff attained by a player using B when virtually all the other players are using B as well. The solid curve represents the critical value of A's cumulative payoff so far. The theorem simply says that B is a collectively stable strategy if and only if it defects whenever the other player's cumulative value so far in the game is above this line. By doing so, B is able to prevent the other player from eventually getting a total expected value of more than rule B gets when playing another rule B.
The characterization theorem is "policyrelevant" in the abstract sense that it specifies what a strategy, B, has to do at any point in time as a function of the previous history of the interaction in order for B to be a collectively stable strategy.8 It is a complete characterization because this requirement is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for strategy B to be collectively stable.
Two additional consequences about collectively stable strategies can be seen from Figure 2 . First, as long as the other player has not accumulated too great a score, a strategy has the flexibility to either cooperate or defect and still be collectively stable. This flexibility explains why there are typically many strategies which are collectively stable. The second consequence is that a nice rule (one which will never defect first) has the most flexibility since it has the highest possible score when playing an identical rule. Put another way, nice rules can afford to be more generous than other 8To be precise, V(BI B) must also be specified in advance. For example, if B is never the first to defect, V(BIB) = RI(1-w).
rules with potential invaders because nice rules do so well with each other.
The flexibility of a nice rule is not unlimited, however, as shown by the following theorem. In fact, a nice rule must be provoked by the very first defection of the other player, i.e., on some later move the rule must have a finite chance of retaliating with a defection of its own. THEOREM 4. For a nice strategy to be collectively stable, it must be provoked by the first defection of the other player.
PROOF. If a nice strategy were not provoked by a defection on move n, then it would not be collectively stable because it could be invaded by a rule which defected only on move n.
Besides provocability, there is another requirement for a nice rule to be collectively stable. This requirement is that the discount parameter w, be sufficiently large. This is a generalization of the second theorem, which showed that for TITFOR TAT to be collectively stable, w has to be large enough. The idea extends beyond just nice rules to any rule which might be the first to cooperate. PROOF. ALL D is always collectively stable because it always defects and hence it defects whenever required by the condition of the characterization theorem. This is an important theorem because of its implications for the evolution of cooperation. If we imagine a system starting with individuals who cannot be enticed to cooperate, the collective stability of ALL D implies that no single individual can hope to do any better than just to go along and be uncooperative as well. A world of "meanies" can resist invasion by anyone using any other strategy-provided that the newcomers arrive one at a time.
The problem, of course, is that a single newcomer in such a mean world has no one who will reciprocate any cooperation. If the newcomers arrive in small clusters, however, they will have a chance to thrive. The next section shows how this can happen.
The Implications of Clustering
To consider arrival in clusters rather than singly, we need to broaden the idea of "invasion" to include invasion by a cluster.9 As before, we will suppose that strategy B is being used by virtually everyone. But now suppose that a small group of individuals using strategy A arrives and interacts with both the other A's and the native B's. To be specific, suppose that the proportion of the interactions by someone using strategy A with another individual using strategy A is p. Thus if the newcomers using TIT FOR TAT have any more than about 5 percent of their interactions with others using TIT FOR TAT, they can thrive in a world in which everyone else refuses ever to cooperate.
In this way, a world of meanies can be invaded by a cluster of TIT FOR TA T-and rather easily at that. To illustrate this point, suppose a business school teacher taught a class to give cooperative behavior a chance, and to reciprocate cooperation 9For related concepts from biology, see Wilson (1979) and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981 Figure 1 , even one interaction out of a thousand with a likeminded follower of TIT FOR TAT is enough for the strategy to invade a world of ALL D's. Even when the median game length is only two moves (w = .5), anything over a fifth of the interactions by the TIT FOR TAT players with like-minded types is sufficient for invasion to succeed and cooperation to emerge.
The next result shows which strategies are the most efficient at invading ALL D with the least amount of clustering. These are the strategies which are best able to discriminate between themselves and ALL D. A strategy is maximally discriminating if it will eventually cooperate even if the other has never cooperated yet, and once it cooperates it will never cooperate again with ALL D but will always cooperate with another player using the same strategy. In the illustrative case of the Senate, Theorem 8 demonstrates that once cooperation based on reciprocity has become established, it can remain stable even if a cluster of newcomers does not respect this senatorial folkway. And Theorem 6 has shown that without clustering (or some comparable mechanism) the original pattern of mutual "treachery" could not have been overcome. Perhaps these critical early clusters were based on the boardinghouse arrangements in the capital during the Jeffersonian era (Young, 1966) . Or perhaps the state delegations and state party delegations were more critical (Bogue and Marlaire, 1975) . But now that the pattern of reciprocity is established, Theorems 2 and 5 show that it is collec-'?This property is possessed by population mixes of nice rules as well. If no single individual can invade a population of nice rules, no cluster can either. tively stable, as long as the biennial turnover rate is not too great.
Thus cooperation can emerge even in a world of unconditional defection. The development cannot take place if it is tried only by scattered individuals who have no chance to interact with each other. But cooperation can emerge from small clusters of discriminating individuals, as long as these individuals have even a small proportion of their interactions with each other. Moreover, if nice strategies (those which are never the first to defect) eventually come to be adopted by virtually everyone, then those individuals can afford to be generous in dealing with any others. The population of nice rules can also protect themselves against clusters of individuals using any other strategy just as well as they can protect themselves against single individuals. But for a nice strategy to be stable in the collective sense, it must be provocable. So mutual cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central control, by starting with a cluster of individuals who rely on reciprocity.
